-Over time, New South Wales state in Australia's Murray-Darling Basin has adapted its water rights legislation to a more flexible approach to balance large variability in flow, increased withdrawals, and the increased acceptance that instream flow requirements need to be satisfied. Innovative approaches include the definition and trading of water use rights, the separation of the rights to access and extract water from the rights to use water, continuous accounting of water entitlements, quasi-proportional sharing of water shortages, and a strong involvement of local communities in the development of river plans and water allocation rules.
A ustralia currently faces a series of challenges in water resource management, but the major challenge dominating the public and political agenda is undoubtedly that of addressing the environmental consequences of high levels of water extractions, particularly, but not only, from the country's inland river systems. Behind this specific challenge lies a suite of component issues for water resource management that do not markedly differ in principle from those in many other countries:
• Broad political acceptance of water as a finite resource is relatively recent.
• Debates about the right balance between water extractions and instream needs are a long way from complete.
• Imminent changes resulting from climate change are predicted in stream flows.
• Complex and ever-changing institutional arrangements for water and natural resources management are resulting from current trends in microeconomic and governance reforms.
This chapter focuses on examining water allocations and the accompanying water rights in the context of the inland Murray-Darling Basin where water use is high and the implications of the component issues are nontrivial. The chapter concentrates on the state of New South Wales (NSW), which occupies a major share of the Murray-Darling Basin and accounts for the bulk of water use from the basin. NSW has also recently taken the innovative step of changing its water rights to separate the rights to access and extract water from the rights to use water.
Australia, and the Murray-Darling Basin in particular, has a number of defining characteristics in terms of water rights:
• a federal system of governance with a constitution that leaves water rights as a matter for sovereign state administration;
• some of the world's older systems of administratively granted usufruct rights;
• a semiarid inland climate; and
• a culture of pioneering that drove intense development of water resources.
The chapter examines how water management issues interact with the basin's defining characteristics and draws out broad lessons in water allocations and in water rights administration. The next section provides background on climate, history, and other factors shaping water management in Australia and the Murray-Darling Basin. New South Wales and other states developed their water rights systems within this context, as the third section describes. The fourth section outlines how reforms emerged, starting with a discussion of Aboriginal water rights. The fifth section examines issues of water licensing, river management, equity, and internal arrangements within irrigation schemes. The final section describes some outcomes of water rights reform in increasing water productivity and enhancing the environment.
Country Background
Australia is an ancient island continent that for tens of thousands of years was peopled by hunter-gatherers. Historians continue to debate estimates of original population numbers, but generally agree that populations were in harmony with the landscape capabilities. In the late 1700s, European settlement began, and today Australia is an industrialized nation of some 20 million people. Australia has a high proportion of migrants, initially from Europe but increasingly from Southeast Asia. Currently, 22 percent of the population was born overseas (ABS 2002) . The original indigenous peoples, or Aboriginals, presently number some 410,000 or about 2.2 percent of the total population.
Australia is one of the driest continents on earth. Climatic zones vary from outright desert throughout most of the inland, to temperate zones in the southeast and southwest, to wet tropical zones in the north. For the eastern states, the Great Dividing Range-a continuous chain of low mountains extending almost the length of the east coast-separates a sparsely populated semiarid interior dominated by agriculture from a relatively well-watered coastal strip that is strongly urbanized and contains most of the population.
Australia's economy initially built on an agricultural base, but today agriculture generates only some 3 percent of gross domestic product and employs 4.6 percent of the national workforce. Agriculture remains important, however, in Australia's balance of payments and represents up to 20 percent of total exports. The gross value of farm production averaged over the last decade is some A$25 billion, of which 71 percent, A$17.6 billion (US$13.0 billion) is exported (AFFA 2001; Australia 2001 ).
The Murray-Darling Basin
Approximately 40 percent of this farm production originates in the Murray-Darling Basin in the eastern half of Australia. See Figure 5 .1 for a map of the basin. The Basin extends over 1,060,000 square kilometers, covering about one seventh of the land area of Australia. It takes its name from two dominant rivers, the Murray and the Darling, with a combined length of 3,780 kilometers. The rivers are characterized by very flat gradients (most of the basin is less than 200 meters above sea level), highly variable flows, and limited runoff. Because of flat gradients and high evaporation, several of the westward-flowing rivers in the center of the basin virtually terminate in deltaic wetlands systems. All of these wetlands are of significant environmental value and are major considerations in environmental management of the rivers.
The water resources of the basin are now highly developed (Crabb 1997 ). Annual runoff is some 24 billion cubic meters (BCM) of which around half is lost to evaporation and other natural processes. Total diversions are around 10.6 BCM, of which some 90 percent goes to irrigation. Storage dams in the basin total 34.7 BCM and support some 1,470,000 hectares of irrigation, representing 70 percent of the Australian total. The basin is now home to nearly 2 million people and boasts a gross domestic product of some A$22 billion.
Frameworks for Defining and Allocating Water Rights
Australia did not exist as a political entity until 1901. Before that time it comprised six sovereign colonies, each governed independently from the United Kingdom. In 1901, the colonies entered into a federation as states of the new Commonwealth of Australia. As initially conceived, the federal level of government dealt primarily with external matters, defense, customs, and the like, leaving natural resources and their management to the newly formed states. While the Australian constitution limits federal government powers, the commonwealth government, by various direct and indirect means, has become steadily more involved in natural resource management.
The constitution continues the rights of the sovereign states to manage their own water resources, but in the last 30 years the subject of possible federal control has been raised more frequently. The water management benefits of this are not especially clear, but the politics proceed apace. The debate has matured in more recent years to one in which the focus for solving interstate issues is more about an oversight of harmonization. This is largely because water management in Australia has moved well beyond consideration of volumes of water to a paradigm that recognizes the multitude of interactions of natural resources, and puts in place an integrated institutional approach. Stand-alone water management agencies no longer exist within basin states. However, this does in turn raise the issue of the role of a basin organization in relation to the role of federal administration in facilitating national policy approaches to water management.
The original agricultural activities of the basin, as elsewhere in Australia, essentially transposed European agriculture, comprising grazing and cropping. The discovery of gold in the second half of the nineteenth century brought an influx of miners and others from the western United States, including the Chaffey brothers, who are credited with the introduction of large-scale irrigation to the Murray Valley. With abundant land, a clear sunny climate, and seemingly plentiful water, the irrigation industry expanded rapidly in the basin.
In an internationally familiar pattern, governments saw a role for themselves in water development, and so built and operated major dams and irrigation areas. There was a prevailing culture of greening the desert or of turning water into gold. Governments built irrigation schemes not as self-contained economic ventures, but rather as part of the development ethic of opening up the inland and promoting the growth of inland "closer" settlements.
The independent activities of the three sovereign states riparian to the Murray River (NSW, Victoria, and South Australia) brought significant conflict and competition for water resources of this transboundary river. In the absence of roads and railways, the Murray River had become a major transport route, but increasing extraction of water for irrigation from this often low-flowing river formed a significant threat to river navigation and trade. The saga of interstate water sharing and the development of the River Murray Commission in 1915 to oversee an interstate agreement on water sharing, joint development infrastructure, and cost sharing is a separate but fascinating study in transboundary water management (Frith and Sawer 1974) .
New South Wales and the Murray-Darling Basin NSW created a Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission in 1912 and gave it responsibility for irrigation development and operations including major dams, plus the administration of water rights. Resource management and environmental protection concepts began to influence changes in NSW public administration in the 1970s. The Irrigation Commission became a Water Resources Commission in 1976 and the state passed its first Environmental Planning and Assessment Act in 1979.
As of early 2003, there was a comprehensive regulatory agency, the Environment Protection Authority, plus a resource management agency-the Department of Land and Water Conservation-responsible for management of soil, water, and vegetation resources, including water rights administration and the administration of integrated catchment (watershed) management. The state has privatized all the former government irrigation schemes and transferred the assets to the new owners. The government's only interaction now with these schemes (totaling around 310,000 hectares) is through single bulk water licenses and various environmental regulations. The government has retained control and ownership of the 16 major rural dams that provide regulated flows for irrigation, towns, and industrial water supply. Table 5 .1 shows actual diversions of surface water in the basin. Table 5 .1 shows NSW to be using by far the largest share of the basin's surface water resources at 57.4 percent of total diversions. By comparing NSW water rights (that is, the issued volumetric entitlements) with conservation storage volumes available in major dams and with the actual average diversions, a picture emerges of the key drivers behind water policy in that state. Table 5 .2 breaks down water diversions for all regulated river systems (that is, river systems with one or more major dams) for the major component watersheds and river systems of NSW.
The comparative aridity of the Australian continent and the high variability of its stream flows meant that wherever water use development (such as irrigation) was undertaken, it was almost always accompanied and supported by conservation dams. Australia stores more water per hectare of irrigation and more water per head of population for urban water supply than almost any other country. All of the major NSW rivers within the basin now have one or more major conservation dams.
Although the footnotes indicate that the figures need some interpretation because of complexities of water sharing between the sovereign states of the basin, Table 5 .2 nonetheless shows that the capacity of the major dams is around twice that of the annual water entitlements. This is a very high ratio by international standards. Nonetheless, the reliability of irrigation water rights can be as low as a 35 percent probability of having full rights available in any one year because of the high variability of river flows. These factors have strongly influenced water rights concepts and administration in NSW. 
The Conceptual Basis of NSW Water Rights
Water law in the former Australian colonies originally reflected the common law of the United Kingdom, which in turn derived from Roman and other ancient law. The existence of the underlying public ownership of the resource (res communis) was not a concept well known or understood by the settlers. The virtually private and perpetual riparian rights that resulted from colonial application of this common law were quickly perceived to be impractical in Australia's semiarid climate. Apart from this, the riparian doctrine formed a significant constraint on the goldmining industry, which was critically dependent on adequate water supplies. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, each of the colonies conducted various public inquiries, Royal Commissions of Inquiry, into the management of their water resources. All recommended replacing common law riparian rights with statutory law that would administratively grant usufruct rights to use water. The first NSW Water Rights Act dates from 1896, but the first comprehensive piece of modern water legislation was the Water Act of 1912. This act survived with amendments until 2000, when the current Water Management Act replaced it, but the underlying water rights principles remain to this day.
The Water Act of 1912 specifically vested in the Crown (in effect, the NSW government) the right to the "use, control, and flow" of all surface and groundwater. It established a hierarchy of use or priority in times of water shortage. Users retained some limited riparian rights for livestock watering and for domestic purposes based on home maintenance concepts. 1 The Act required that all other extractions of water be subject to the issue of a license that was, in essence, a license for works to take water from a river, lake, or aquifer. It limited the duration of these licenses, provided for renewal of the licenses, and allowed conditions to be attached to the licenses-such as limiting the size of an area to be irrigated, controlling flow rates and pollution, and so forth. The Act allowed for minor public participation in the licensing process, including the referral of objections to issue of license to a local land board.
Later modernizing amendments provided for the levying of water supply charges where a government work augmented or assured the supply in a river. The amendments also enabled volumetric allocation schemes on rivers and aquifers that set limits on total extractions according to the capacity of the resource, and that shared available water between users on a metered volumetric basis. They also provided for temporary trading of water volumes between holders of licenses, permanent trading of the water licenses themselves, and water planning generally.
Initially, in keeping with the thinking of the times, government irrigation schemes were not part of this water rights system. Irrigation districts, privately owned lands supplied with water by government-owned and operated infrastructure, were included in a special part of the Water Act, but were effectively exempt from licensing. Irrigation areas, government infrastructure servicing government-owned lands leased to farmers, had a separate Irrigation Act, again not part of the licensing process. For both areas and districts, each irrigation farm had a so-called water right that was an annual volume of water more or less guaranteed as a minimum supply. In most years when additional water was available, more water was supplied than specified by this water right and irrigation enterprises began to rely on such additional water.
Although the licensing legislation covered urban water supplies, the government gave scant attention to domestic use until recent years because the Water Act already gave such water the highest priority. As demand for water grew, town water supplies also became subject to volumetric licenses and holders of those licenses were allowed to trade.
Initial allocation of the licensed water rights was essentially on a "first come, first served basis" until the 1970s, when limited resources caused all the main rivers to be closed to further license applications. Note that this is not equivalent to a prior appropriation system-the rights when granted have no seniority attributes and all rights for the same use purpose are treated equally, including in allocation of available water supplies.
The agricultural community in the early years was firmly built around a family farm concept. Irrigation was perceived as something that people undertook in a government irrigation area or district, or undertook as a supplement to traditional farming in the form of a drought-proofing investment. After World War II, the NSW government stepped up construction of headwork dams in the MurrayDarling Basin, but, initially at least, it had to encourage farmers to take up available licenses. These licenses were limited, in area per property on each river, to a figure derived from notions of equitable access and of home maintenance. This was generally 162 hectares on those rivers with flows regulated and augmented by stateowned dams.
Some statistics on Australian farm businesses can help put the Australian experience in perspective with its neighbors in Southeast Asia. The first and foremost thing to note is the contemporary use of the word business. While farming still has strong connotations of a way of life, farming in Australia has never been purely subsistence. It has always been a commercial venture for the production of commodities-despite earlier sociopolitical allocation of lands under closer settlement policies and the like. With Australia now operating in a low-or nil tariff agricultural trade environment, the need for business skills ranks as highly as the need for agronomic skills. Farmers with business degrees are no longer uncommon. This has significant implications for water trading as discussed later.
Second, flowing from both the commercial factors and geographical factors, farm sizes are generally comparatively large. Farm size ranges from less than 10 hectares for horticulture to more than 10,000 hectares for large grazing properties, with a median size of around 300 hectares, as shown in Figure 5 .2.
Irrigation farms in the Murray-Darling Basin have a smaller size range. Horticulture is usually around 10 hectares, although large commercial ventures growing wine grapes range up to 1,000 hectares. A single-family rice farm will typically grow a single crop annually of about 100 hectares. Irrigated cotton farms are larger, with a family-owned farm generally about 400 hectares, although corporate farms can be many times larger (Dunlop and Foran 2001) . Individual irrigated farms can therefore be significant in terms of water use. Average applications of irrigation water in the basin (excluding rice) are in the range of 6 to 8 megaliters (ML) per hectare (1 ML = 1,000 cubic meters). Rice (in laser-leveled fields) uses about twice these amounts. Allocation of water to each licensee is covered in more detail later in this chapter.
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vidual license. Legal issues surrounding this are complex, but the principle was that this was a natural resource, owned by the people collectively, and the rights to use this resource should be attenuated in the public interest. As could be expected, this is the subject of considerable debate as states seek to recover water for instream uses. The new NSW Water Management Act of 2000 has modified this uncompromising approach of the earlier legislation, as discussed later in this chapter in the subsection on recent water rights reforms.
The Political Economy of Creating and Reforming Water Rights Systems
The early adoption of comprehensive water rights, before major water use development, with no riparian rights other than limited livestock and domestic uses, distinguishes Australia from many other countries. Economic considerations drove this early adoption as governments realized in the late 1800s that a riparian rights system placed control of water in the hands of landholders and was a major constraint in the development of a mining industry. This, coupled with the immense variability in runoff, led governments to firmly take up the allocation and management of water rights in the interest of orderly development of the resource.
Aboriginal Water Rights
Traditional use rights have gained close attention only in recent years and are still a matter of debate and resolution through the courts. The Aboriginal peoples of Australia were hunter-gatherers. Water resources formed a natural habitat for food sources. Water has a deep spiritual significance for Aboriginal peoples that is still poorly understood (much is secret) and was certainly not understood at all by the early European settlers. When the British first raised their flag on January 26, 1788, they regarded Australia as terra nullius-that is, unoccupied in any sense of land property rights. Recent court cases have overturned the terra nullius doctrine. Subsequent laws now recognize a form of native title that pertains to traditional activities-spiritual, ceremonial, hunting, and the like. While the equivalent position in water is still evolving, modern water legislation such as the NSW Water Management Act of 2000 provides for the holders of native title (to land), without need for a license, to take and use water in exercise of their native title rights. They may not build dams or bores (wells) without approval, and regulations limit the amount of water they can take each year.
The quantities of water currently involved in the exercise of native title rights are generally trivial in the overall management of water rights. They have had limited impact on allocation schemes that were in place before the recognition of native title. There have, however, been some impacts in a number of special cases where umbrella environmental laws required government water agencies to take account of matters of aboriginal significance. One such case in northern NSW involved the Boobera Lagoon, regarded by local aboriginal peoples as the home of the Rainbow Serpent and therefore of critical importance to the Dreamtime (Macintyre 1999).
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The water agency put special restrictive conditions on water extraction licenses from the lagoon to preserve the Aboriginal heritage values.
The Emergence of a Need for Reforms
Water rights, as created in the first half of the twentieth century, were shaped around strong social concepts of equity. Widespread water sharing was sought by limiting access to a level deemed to be needed for home maintenance. At the same time, for licensed water users, there were no fees or charges for the water used even though public monies funded the major conservation dams. This culture led to a number of unsustainable consequences. Users often did not place a high value on water, and many licenses stayed dormant. In turn, this caused the water agency to suppose that such under-use of available supplies was a permanent feature of NSW irrigation practices. The agency assumed an under-use factor as high as 30 percent on some rivers for purposes of planning the volumetric allocation limits applicable to each river.
With the introduction of irrigated cotton in the 1960s, the era of licensed irrigation farming as a large-scale industry in its own right began, but was severely constrained by the limited water available to any single licensee. Irrigators began circumventing these constraints by elaborate schemes of leasing land in order to accumulate and amalgamate the water volumes needed. Farmers subdivided or leased their land to individuals (often family members) who then each applied for a 162-hectare license. They continued to operate the whole as a single enterprise.
The advent of large-scale irrigation and the flawed assumption of a permanent under-use of licenses, led to an over-allocation of resources with consequences for water supply reliability and for the instream environment. Intense use of water, coupled with agricultural practices in the dry land areas that reflected a European approach rather than Australian realities, has brought a range of natural resource issues into focus. Irrigation-induced salinity appeared more than 30 years ago, but there is now growing evidence of decline in native fish populations, loss of vegetation, degradation of soils, and water quality decline bringing about algal blooms.
The state economy and the community were getting poor value from their water resources as water was locked up in unused or partially used licenses, was frequently used for low-value irrigation, and new enterprises were having difficulty in accessing water. Aging infrastructure requiring refurbishment or renewal was not able to attract public capital funds with the same ease enjoyed by the original construction. In turn, this led to increasing risks and an escalation of operations and maintenance costs with impacts on public recurrent expenditure accounts.
This led to debates about the nature of water management and to conflict between those who favored liberal social goals and those who favored economic goals. Others began to realize the environmental damage resulting from river regulation and high levels of water extraction and campaigned for environmental goals. Discussion about water as a commodity began. The first real questioning of the economic value of irrigation also began-previously the intrinsic worth of irrigation was taken for granted, especially in political circles.
Eventually, the principles of what we now recognize as modern integrated water resources management (IWRM) began to emerge. This paralleled debates elsewhere, although the Australian debate occurred somewhat independently and rather more as a sectoral response to sweeping national microeconomic reforms.
The first genuinely economic response in NSW to modern IWRM was in 1983-84, when the state was in the grip of a severe drought. Water allocations to individual licensees were very low, at about 10-20 percent of licensed water entitlements. 3 In recognition that these volumes were too low for any individual to invest in planting a crop, but could nonetheless generate economic activity if amalgamated, the government announced that irrigators could trade their available water temporarily on an annual basis. After initial apprehension (possibly at the demise of a pervading social view of water resources), irrigators took up the scheme enthusiastically. Twenty years later, water trading forms an integral part of irrigation farm business planning.
The 1980s in fact saw the beginnings of substantial reform. Governments, including that of NSW, began to introduce charges for water taken from the state's rivers and aquifers. This began as a metering fee, but was later augmented by a delivery service charge. This latter charge was calculated as meeting the private good component of the recurrent costs of operations and maintenance of dams and rivers. There are no fees or charges for the water itself by way of royalties or resource rents. The charges are only for value-added services. However, the doctrine of full-cost recovery gained political acceptance and was progressively applied.
Water policy began to reflect environmental studies showing a decline in river health. Some states began to search for ways to halt or reverse the decline. Apart from some localized successes, the decline in the health of inland rivers has continued and has become a significant national political issue. A recent study (CSIRO 2001) of the river condition in the Murray-Darling Basin showed that 40 percent of the river length assessed had biota that was significantly impaired. The study found about 10 percent of the river length to be severely impaired, having lost at least 50 percent of the types of aquatic invertebrates expected to occur there. It found more than 95 percent of the river length assessed in the Murray-Darling Basin has an environmental condition that is degraded, and 30 percent is substantially modified from the original condition.
Furthermore, the basin is geologically and climatically prone to concentrating salt in the landscape. A recent comprehensive salinity audit of the basin showed extensive rising water tables and soil salinization brought about by land-use changes since European settlement (MDBC 1999) . Widespread clearing of vegetation accompanied these changes, which has increased the amount of rainfall entering the soil profile. This has gradually filled shallow aquifers, thus bringing natural salt to the land surface and to the rivers. Currently, some 5.1 million tons of salt are mobilized annually. Estimates suggest that the salt-affected area of 350,000 hectares may rise to as much as 9 million hectares before reaching a new hydrologic equilibrium. The effects on river water salinity are equally profound.
The need for environmental flows 4 in the rivers and for the reallocation of water from consumptive use to instream uses is clearly acute. However, as shown later, the increasing capital value of water rights makes purchase of sufficient quantities of the rights to achieve desirable improvements in river health a major imposition on the public purse. It is also well out of the reach of any private institution.
A National Water Reform Agenda
In 1994, the Council of Australian Governments 5 (COAG) agreed on the need for a national water reform program and issued a comprehensive statement of principles and processes. Much of the program relates to institutional reform of the water sector to align with the National Competition Policy, such as the separation of water utilities from resource management agencies. COAG also agreed on the need for environmental flows, although this need was expressed within the context of a major review of water allocation policies, which sought, among other goals, to establish a national framework for the implementation of property rights in water to facilitate the growing trade in water rights. The COAG water reforms contained a number of major elements (AFFA 2003) .
All water pricing is to be based on the principles of consumption-based pricing, full cost recovery, and transparency of cross-subsidies with removal of crosssubsidies not consistent with efficient and effective service, use, and provision. For urban water services, charges include an access and usage component. For metropolitan bulk-water suppliers, charges are on a volumetric basis to recover all costs. Any future new investment in irrigation schemes, or extensions to existing schemes, is to be undertaken only after appraisal indicates it is economically viable and ecologically sustainable.
State and territory governments are to implement comprehensive systems of water allocations or entitlements, which are to be backed by the separation of water property rights from land and include clear specification of entitlements in terms of ownership, volume, reliability, transferability, and, if appropriate, quality. The formal determination of water allocations or entitlements includes allocations for the environment as a legitimate user of water. Trading (including across state and territory borders) of water allocations and entitlements is within the social or physical and ecological constraints of catchments.
In addition, states agreed that there should be an integrated catchment management approach to water resources that, as far as possible, separates resource management and regulatory roles of government from water service provision. The integrated approach should give greater local-level responsibility for water resource management, promote greater public education about water use and consultation in implementing water reforms, and provide research into technologies for water use efficiency and related areas.
The COAG Water Reforms were not so much a new policy direction as a consolidation of emerging state policies, but the COAG-endorsed reforms provided the impetus for a consistent national effort. The property rights context caused many in the water industry to see environmental provisions in the simplistic and inadequate light of a volumetric allocation for the environment. It also incidentally caused many irrigators to mistakenly imagine that the property right would be a title to the water itself rather than a usufruct right, and that the rights might be undiminished in perpetuity.
A council of government ministers known as the Agriculture and Resource Management Council of Australia and New Zealand, together with the Australian and New Zealand Environment and Conservation Council, prepared a policy document summarizing and collating state approaches to property rights into a consistent policy statement with a set of agreed principles (ARMCANZ 1995). All consumptive and nonconsumptive water entitlements should be allocated and managed in accordance with comprehensive planning systems and based on full basin-wide hydrologic assessment of the resource. Water entitlements and institutional arrangements should be structured so as not to impede the effective operation of water markets and such that, as far as practicable, trading options associated with property rights in water reside with the individual end-users of water.
Water entitlements should be specified in terms of (1) rights and conditions of ownership tenure, (2) share of natural resource being allocated (including probability of occurrence), (3) details of agreed standards of any commercial services to be delivered, (4) constraints to and rules on transferability, and (5) constraints to resource use or access. Acceptable rules on the holding and trading of environmental flow entitlements should be resolved by jurisdictions at the same time as determining the appropriate balance between consumptive and nonconsumptive uses of water.
Where interstate trading of entitlements is possible, jurisdictions should cooperatively develop, on a catchment by catchment basis, compatible processes for (or at least clear conversion mechanisms between) planning systems and basin-wide hydrologic assessment methods, water entitlement specifications, pricing and asset valuation arrangements, water entitlement trading arrangements, and provisions for environmental and other instream values. In implementing and initializing property rights in water, jurisdictions should call on water users, interest groups, and the general community to be involved as partners in catchment planning processes that affect the future allocation and management of water entitlements. Governments should give urgent priority to establishing the administrative and regulatory arrangements that are necessary to implement and support the strategic framework.
An intergovernmental committee subsequently developed a set of national guidelines (ARMCANZ 1996) for the provision of water for ecosystems that were issued in 1996. All of these represent an agreed on common approach of the various states to water allocation policies and to the formulation of water use rights. Actual implementation, however, shows a number of differences in philosophy.
The Murray-Darling Basin Cap
An audit of water use in the Murray-Darling Basin showed a continued steady growth as users progressively activated unused water rights, as indicated in Figure  5 .3 (MDBC 1995). In the light of the evident stress on the basin's river systems, the Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial Council agreed on the need to balance between consumptive and instream uses of water in the basin and, for this purpose, introduced a cap on further increases in diversions or extractions. Cap is the abbreviated term used in the Murray-Darling Basin to describe a limit set on volumes of water extractions. In July 1995, the council agreed to limit the annual levels of water extraction from the basin's rivers to those applicable to the levels of development that existed in 1993-94.
This decision does not refer to the actual volume of water used in 1993-94. Rather, the limit in any year is the volume of water that would have been used with the infrastructure (pumps, dams, channels, areas developed for irrigation, management rules, and so forth) that existed in 1993-94, assuming climatic and hydrologic conditions similar to those experienced in the year in question. That is, the limit in each subcatchment varies year by year in response to climatic conditions. The limit in dry years is higher, for example, than in wet years. The decision is not an attempt to reduce basin water extractions, but is intended simply to prevent them from increasing.
A significant implication of the Cap, as it became known, is that all future growth in water-based economic productivity must come from gains in water use efficiency, or from water trade. As a result, the market value of irrigation water entitlements virtually doubled overnight ( Figure 5.4) .
With water rights now selling for A$1,000 per ML (A$1 per cubic meter) and basin water use in excess of 10,000 million cubic meters (MCM) per year, to recover 15 percent of this use through purchase would cost in excess of A$1.5 billion. This scale of cost has caused NSW in particular, as the largest water user, to look on the property rights aspects of water rights in a new light.
Recent Water Rights Reforms in NSW
As noted, for many decades NSW has had a comprehensive water rights system governing all extractions of surface and groundwater. The major reform prior to the 1980s was to convert all rights, except those on small, unregulated streams, into a volumetric basis and to close each river progressively to new license applications. This set up the necessary preconditions for water trading.
Water Trading. As previously described, severe drought in the early 1980s prompted the first limited trading of water quantities. The community had previously expressed apprehension and even opposition to notions of water trading. Many saw it as the end of equitable sharing policies and the substitution of purely economic goals for earlier social goals. Nevertheless, the drought provided the necessary sociopolitical impetus to overcome this reluctance. The temporary trading of water volumes was quickly augmented to include the permanent trading of the water rights themselves. Trade has been buoyant since that time.
Environmental interests were concerned that water rights could migrate in a manner that would further upset the already heavily disturbed river flow patterns in regulated rivers, or would concentrate water use in undesirable ways. However, environmental laws were strong enough for it to be illegal for a water agency to approve anything with significant adverse consequences. There is also a lingering concern among local government authorities that profitable irrigation currently 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 Irrigation season
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Note: 1 ML = 1,000 cubic meters.
adding value to the local economy could migrate to other local government areas that, for example, had better soils. After 15 years of trading, there is little evidence of this happening. The major issue with the trading of water rights arose because the legislation attached water rights to a particular parcel of land. The capital value of the water right became capitalized into the value of the land. Where the land was collateral for various financial arrangements such as mortgages, the separation of the water right posed a significant issue for both financial institutions and for the landowner. The water agency therefore required a letter of agreement from any party having a financial interest in the property to accompany any application for permanent transfer of water rights. From a water management aspect, the water agency took a simple approach. It would approve a water transfer if it was operationally possible and there were no adverse environmental impacts. This included approval of temporary (i.e., water volumes, not water rights) transfers between valleys where the rivers or delivery systems have some physical interconnection. Thus, water from the Murrumbidgee River, which is a major tributary of the Murray River, could be sold to the Darling River, which also joins the Murray River, even though the rivers and properties concerned might be 400 kilometers apart.
Environmental Flows-The NSW River Flow Objectives. New South Wales has perhaps the most comprehensive approach to environmental flows. In the early 1990s, it developed a multipart approach to environmental flows (Haisman 1993) . Together, these formed a flexible means of attaining environmental goals, which works through a set of merit-based decisions. The following are the key elements:
• minimum flow rules for releases from storages and for pumping from unregulated rivers;
• reservation of water within storage to meet environmental contingencies;
• unregulated flow management to preserve important elements of high flows; and
• specific entitlements for environmental or instream use.
In 1995, the state embarked on a process of determining River Flow Objectives, accompanied by a parallel and complementary set of Water Quality Objectives for every river in the state. The government endorsed these objectives. Broadly speaking, the environmental regulator, the Environment Protection Authority, sets objectives for the resource manager, the Department of Land and Water Conservation, to accomplish. The resource manager achieves this through direct operational management of the dams that it controls on many of the rivers, and through conditioned licensing of the water extractions by private diverters and by public utilities. The important aspect of these environmental flows for water rights is that they diminish the water available for license holders and this has affected water policy. Structural adjustment assistance for changes in water entitlements is an issue for all MurrayDarling Basin states and is the subject of national attention by COAG. The NSW River Flow Objectives process began by expanding the key elements of environmental flows into a set of principles for the NSW Murray-Darling Basin rivers (Haisman 1999) . Reaching agreement on the recommended environmental flow objectives or targets for each river was subject to an initial, wide public consultation process. The negotiation process then passed to River Management Committees set up for the purpose, comprising a range of stakeholders, including water users and environmental interests. The NSW government generally accepted these committees' recommendations for interim flow objectives, but had previously let it be known that it considered a decrease in water availability for consumptive uses of up to 10 percent to be reasonable. This decrease in water availability occurs through a change in reliability, not a change in the nominal volumetric allocations, so in practice its impact varies with climatic conditions. The adopted packages of interim flow objectives have a heavy emphasis on passing flows for dams, based on principles of so-called translucency. This concept relates to the effect of a dam on flow. If a dam were to pass all inflow, it would be transparent. If a dam were to stop all flow, it would be opaque. In between these hypothetical extremes, the flow is translucent to an extent expressed as a percentage of the inflow released-the higher the figure, the more translucent. Translucent operation of a major dam usually occurs in winter and spring months. Dam operators release a proportion of daily inflow so that downstream river flows mimic natural variability-but with reduced magnitude.
Environmental scientists universally agree on the ecological value of mimicking natural flow variability, particularly for native fish species and macroinvertebrates. The decision support system for the River Flow Objectives models a daily time-step, flow simulation model for each river, directly coupled with a regional economic model for the catchment to evaluate socioeconomic impacts.
An interesting aspect of the NSW approach in relation to water rights is the setting aside of environmental allocations. The first and most studied of these served the critically important Macquarie Marshes. These form a major wetlands system extending over some 1,500 square kilometers near the center of the MurrayDarling Basin. The Ramsar Convention lists them as a wetland of international significance. The marshes are one of the largest semipermanent wetlands in southeastern Australia, and include important breeding sites for water birds. The deltaic wetlands occur near the end of a river system that is regulated by two reservoirs in its upper reaches. Burrendong Dam has a conservation storage of 1,198 MCM plus a further 489 MCM for flood storage, while Windamere Dam has a capacity of 368 MCM. They principally regulate water supplies for irrigation.
Irrigation extractions of some 395 MCM per year had reduced average yearly inflows to the marshes from 525 MCM under natural conditions to around 350 MCM. As with all variable systems, these averages conceal some of the more extreme changes. Growing evidence of substantial decline in both area and ecological function led in 1986 to an Australian first. After much debate, an allocation to the marshes of 50 MCM annually of very high security water was set aside under the control of the NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service. This wildlife allocation was the centerpiece of the 1986 Macquarie Marshes Management Plan that included complex rules for delivery of the allocation, provision for monitoring and research, and an irrigation policy that controlled the nature and extent of irrigation near the marshes.
A major review of the plan in 1994 revealed that decline of the marshes was not likely to cease, and that not only was further water required, but that the plan needed improvement, particularly in the matter of public auditing and community involvement. A new and more sophisticated plan was approved in 1996 with a strong emphasis on adaptive management, and provision for a broad-based Advisory and Audit Committee. A key feature for delivery now of the wetlands allocation is to tie it to rainfall events, thus being able to augment water to the marshes by "piggy-backing" on natural flow events. A community-based Land and Water Management Plan complements the Macquarie Marshes Management Plan.
The most controversial element of the new plan was the provision for a further 75 MCM of environmental allocation, to be supplied at the same reliability as irrigation water in the Macquarie Valley. This new combined allocation to the marshes reduced average diversions for irrigation from 395 MCM per year to 340 MCM per year, a reduction of more than 10 percent. Irrigation interests protested that compensation should accompany this reduction. The NSW government responded by including ongoing socioeconomic studies as part of the plan and setting aside funds for assistance with structural adjustment as part of the statewide water reform agenda. Interestingly, anecdotal evidence from the valley is showing that the irrigation industry has generally risen to the challenge. With a combination of better risk management made possible by flexible water accounting, and through on-farm efficiencies, overall production has not suffered unduly. Again, of course, averages conceal extremes, and weaker enterprises are feeling the strain.
Continuous Accounting. The term continuous accounting refers to a flexible system of water accounting coming into use on regulated rivers. The previous system of annual allocation of available water among license holders on regulated rivers remained quite simple for many years. The water management agency allocated available water in each river basin (water in storage plus likely minimum inflows) less losses and commitments as a percentage of each license holder's annual entitlement. This percentage was reviewed monthly and increased in response to any further system inflows until the maximum of 100 percent was reached. The agency delivered water from headworks reservoirs against orders placed by the license holder up to the currently allocated amount, with any unused water forfeited at the end of the year and returned to the common pool. NSW is progressively abandoning annual forfeiture rules in favor of a variety of carryover and quasi-continuous accounting rules.
These rules allow individual water users to carry over some or all of their unused entitlement from one year to the next. They can then use this carryover in addition to any water they receive as part of the annual allocation for the next season. Some systems continuously account for water, with newly available water being continuously shared and added to each water user's account. This enables a license holder to continually assess their available options for use of the allocated water. They can use it (for irrigation or any other authorized use), they can sell it on the temporary transfer market, or they can leave up to one year's additional allocation in the state storage indefinitely. This has revolutionized business planning by irrigators and eliminated potential wastage of water at the end of each season. The system allows each irrigator to apply their own levels of risk management to their enterprise rather than have the state do it for them collectively through allocation announcements under the "use it or lose it" previous system of end-of-year forfeiture. In the Macquarie Valley, where the system is most advanced, there has been an increase in the income per hectare (Dunlop and Foran 2001) .
Water Management Act of 2000. By the 1990s, it was clear that the old Water Act of 1912 with its myriad amendments over time was in need of a thorough rewrite to meet modern IWRM goals. Accordingly, after issuance of a White Paper and significant community consultation, the NSW Parliament passed the Water Management Act of 2000. There are many administrative improvements, and several important new elements from a water rights policy perspective.
The Act separated the right to extract or divert surface water or groundwater from the right to use it for a particular purpose at a particular place. The Act distinguishes these rights as access licenses and water use approvals, respectively. This innovation aims to facilitate water trading. Under NSW environmental laws, the process of gaining approval for a water-using enterprise, whether agricultural or industrial, can be quite protracted and may even involve the full public processes of a statutory environmental impact statement. Formerly, when a landholder acquired additional water by way of trade, it was necessary to go through the entire environmental approval process for each increment of permanent trade. Under the new Water Management Act, an enterprise can now separately acquire environmental and other approvals for the maximum amount of water ever likely to be used at the site, including the maximum expected transfers-whether or nor the applicant has a right to extract water. The approving agency can now rapidly approve water trading, or in other words the acquisition of additional water access rights, without needing to consider the impacts of the use of that water. It considers only operational feasibility (river channel capacity, for example) and instream environmental effects, if any. These provisions also effectively bring to an end the nexus between a parcel of land and any water right used on that land. The Act therefore also contains provisions for the protection of the interests of those who may have financial interests in the land-such as mortgagors and the like.
The Act revised priority of use under conditions of water shortage, to increase the priority of environmental needs. In brief, the priorities are the following:
1. human needs (domestic water); 2. environmental needs; 3. commercial water use (urban) and high security licenses; and 4. normal security licenses (irrigation).
The Act was designed to increase security for entitlement holders (holders of access licenses) through introduction of a common set of license conditions for each valley or river system. A community-based Water Management Committee develops an approved Water Management Plan that sets these license conditions for the particular river. The Water Management Plans take into account a State Water Management Outcomes Plan issued from time to time by the minister that details the outcomes sought from application of the water management principles of the Act. Licenses last for up to 15 years (compared to 5 years under the Water Act 1912) and the applicable Water Management Plan holds for 10 years. The Act allows a license holder to claim compensation if the minister varies a Water Management Plan in a manner that reduces a water allocation.
This approach applies adaptive management. The common Water Management Plan for discrete water resources gives water users common license conditions for a fixed term (10 years) to facilitate investment, while protecting the state's right to amend the license on renewal should environmental or other considerations make this desirable. This is intended to avoid huge public capital costs that might otherwise be involved in purchasing water rights for the public good in the form of environmental flows.
The Act imposed controls on water harvesting by landholders. Water harvesting refers to capture of over-the-ground, run-off flows of water that are not in a recognized watercourse or river. This typically involves building diversion levees or embankments leading to an excavated reservoir. The intensity of water use in NSW is so high that such collection of runoff water on individual properties significantly affects river flows. A landholder may now only harvest up to 10 percent of the surface run-off from their property.
The Act reverses the previous philosophy of developing water projects and then checking their environmental effects. The approach now prioritizes river health and requires that water management and development conform to the needs of the environment. In addition, apart from a significantly more integrated approach to water resource management, the Act strongly increases the role of the community in water planning and management through partnerships with the government.
Implementation, Administration, and Management of Water Rights Systems Water License Approvals and License Administration
Although the Water Management Act 2000 expressly gives power to the Minister for Land and Water Conservation to grant water licenses, in practice NSW delegates water resource management generally, and specifically for the water license approval and administration process. The Act establishes this power by confirming what amounts in lay terms to the public ownership of water as detailed below in Section 392 of the Act: The Act then creates a public corporation called the Water Administration Ministerial Corporation as a statutory body representing the Crown and gives it the power to implement the Act. The Act deems anything the minister does in the name of the Ministerial Corporation to be an act of the corporation. The Ministerial Corporation has no staff other than by making use of the staff (public servants) of the Department of Land and Water Conservation (DLWC), and in fact exercises its functions in the name of this department. The Ministerial Corporation can sue and be sued, and can enter into commercial business arrangements (with certain approvals) such as commercial operations in respect of the services provided by its dams and other assets, commercial operations involving its intellectual property, or the formation of commercial partnerships or companies. This legal construct gives continuity and commercial attributes to the management of the state's water that are not readily available under the normal administration of the public service. The Water Management Act then authorizes the Ministerial Corporation to delegate the exercise of any of its functions (other than this power of delegation) to any person. The Act delegates almost all functions to the director general of the DLWC. In turn, the director general, under terms of other public service legislation, delegates functions to the lowest competent level. DLWC is highly regionalized into eight regions; each managed by a regional director with significant powers and responsibilities. Figure 5 .5 shows the functions within a regional office.
The delegation to approve the granting and issuance of a water license extends to the manager of water administration and certain of their staff. Powers of license suspension for breach of conditions, particularly regarding the volumes of water taken are similarly delegated, including to the metering inspectors who collate and manage water orders on regulated rivers and who oversee the volumes and rates of water withdrawals under both surface and groundwater licenses.
The resources needed for direct water rights administration are consistently underestimated. NSW has issued 130,000 licenses for surface and groundwater (DLWC 1998) . About 25 directly involved licensing officers and support staff work in regional offices: a group of about 10 in the Sydney head office manages statewide systems and administrative matters. In addition, there are some 45 metering officers. Anecdotal evidence indicates that these groups are stretched in coping with both routine license administration and with the additional work of system change to meet reform objectives. Because of policies of full cost recovery, customer groups exert significant pressure to minimize staff numbers.
As already noted, there is strong community participation in the preparation of water management plans that define water sharing rules and water source protection, and in effect define the conditions to be attached to water licenses. A community-based committee develops the draft plan. The draft plan goes on public exhibition for 40 days and the committee may receive comments for consideration. This is a highly simplified description and, in fact, the definition of the contents of water management plans and the rigorous arrangements for their development and implementation are the subject of 17 pages of legislation.
This comprehensive public approach to plan development means that the granting of access licenses (licenses to take water from a water source) that are in accord with the provisions of a water management plan is now a streamlined and almost automatic process. Previous detailed arrangements in the 1912 Water Act for advertising and the hearing of objections and appeals through legal tribunals and the courts are no longer necessary in the majority of cases.
The Water Management Act does retain provisions for the public advertising of license applications and a more streamlined consideration of objections for access license applications in areas that do not have a water management plan in force. The Act also allows appeals to the NSW Land and Environment Court in a number of instances, including by an applicant when the agency refuses a license application or by an objector when it grants a license application.
Accountability and transparency are major principles behind water license administration. The Act requires that a register, publicly available free of charge, record: The provisions at (c) are critically important now that water licenses are no longer tied to any particular parcel of land and are thus quite separate assets in legal and financial terms. For purposes of license administration, DLWC has developed a computer-based management system, which it operates statewide over a wide area network. This system manages every step of the licensing process, and links to water-use databases and the associated water billing systems. The new legislation has required a major and complete overhaul of the management systems to cater to the significant changes in administration. Water use approvals (the right to use water for a particular purpose at a particular location) are a separate matter. They essentially approve the environmental management associated with any particular water use. This creates the strongest interaction between the Water Management Act 2000 and NSW's primary environmental management legislation, the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979. Because this is not a water rights matter, only a few observations are offered here.
Some applications for a water use approval require submitting a management program for the affected land, and certain classes of use require public advertising. Where applications are advertised and there are objections, the minister must attempt to resolve the issues raised by the objection by means of consultation with the applicant and the objector, with a view to reaching agreement on the matters raised by the objection. This can be dealt with by mediation or neutral evaluation as applicable. At the end of this process, the minister can decide on the application, whether or not agreement has been reached. In some cases, application of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act may lead to public inquiries through a formal Commission of Inquiry. The Water Management Act requires the minister to have regard for the findings and recommendation of the Commission of Inquiry. As with access license administration, the administration of water use approvals is largely undertaken at the regional office level of DLWC.
Water Rights on Regulated Rivers
The allocation of water to access license holders varies between regulated rivers, those where the flows are augmented and modified by a state-owned dam, and unregulated rivers, those without any state dams. On regulated rivers, the access license confers a right for an annual allocation volume of water expressed in megaliters, but only to the extent that water is actually available. The management of allocations is undertaken by an organization called State Water, which is an internal business unit of DLWC responsible for dam asset management and for the operation of the various weirs and dams.
State Water regularly calculates the percentage of allocation available by adding the water already in storage to minimum expected inflows, then subtracting system losses and environmental requirements. When this percentage is announced, State Water also announces the probabilities of various degrees of improvement within specified times. Thus, a typical allocation announcement might be: "Murrumbidgee irrigators are advised that 65 percent of allocations are currently available. There is a 60 percent chance this will rise to 75 percent by December and a 45 percent chance of 100 percent allocations by the same date."
Regulated water rights in NSW therefore have two key attributes-the allocated volume and the long-term computed probability of availability in any one year. On most regulated rivers in NSW, including all those in the MDB, access licenses are either high security, around 99 percent, or general security, lying in the 35-70 percent security range. Town water supply license-holders, some industries, and irrigators of permanent plantings such as orchards or vines typically use high security licenses. General security licenses are nearly all for irrigation. Today, water trading enables a license holder to alter his security at will by the purchase of additional entitlements.
River operators, who are typically professional engineers, manage the allocated water at the regional level, working with highly trained metering officers. The river operators oversee system hydrology, calculate allocations, and issue operating instructions to the resident staff at the major dams and weirs. Most of the diversion and regulatory weirs are now automated and operated remotely.
The river operators are required to consult continually with water users and other interests and will typically develop annual operating strategies through this process. It is illegal for an access license-holder to take water from a regulated river without first having placed an order for the required volumes and delivery times. It is the task of metering officers to oversee this process, to audit the taking of water, and to oversee regional billing processes.
Water Rights on Unregulated Rivers
Because water use on unregulated rivers is small compared to that on the regulated rivers, DLWC had until fairly recently paid only limited attention to unregulated water rights. The advent of river health concerns, the shortage of water in regulated systems, and favorable commodity prices for wine grapes and for niche fruit and berry crops have now together created a focus on unregulated rivers.
The hydrology behind license allocation is for the most part fairly basic, except for a few of the more significant rivers, because of the earlier focus elsewhere in the river systems. Nonetheless, as with all NSW water licenses, the allocation system provides a basis for sharing available flows rather than the creation of a right to any absolute volumes of water.
Until recently these licenses specified a maximum area to be irrigated, but the need for more intense management has brought about a continuing conversion to a volumetric basis of allocation, plus the associated need for metering. The volumetric conversions create access entitlements with both an annual access limit and three classes of daily access conditions (these conditions include flow trigger levels and daily extraction limits). The classes generally relate to the size (and sometimes purpose) of the access license.
In general, the amount of water available to an access license-holder depends on the following:
1. The annual access volume on their access license. They can divert twice this volume in any one year, provided they do not exceed three times this volume in any three-year period.
2. The amount of water they can extract from available flow each day (determined by their daily flow extraction entitlements).
At times of plentiful flows, the management of rights consists simply of policing access license conditions, and in auditing and monitoring the taking of water. When water shortages become severe, however, the DLWC license administration officers become very busy, as they must progressively suspend rights in accordance with the legislative priority uses, and oversee voluntary rostering or other temporary water sharing strategies. The need to conform to the Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial Council's Cap on extractions has further augmented the requirement for more intense management of unregulated flows. Virtually all unregulated rivers have longstanding water users' associations. DLWC officers will normally leave the development of rosters to these associations, while providing technical assistance and advice. The advantage of this process, apart from requiring only limited resources from DLWC, is that such associations are not limited in the factors they may consider in allocating roster times. Thus, a landholder who has had their irrigation pump break down at a critical time may receive sympathetic treatment by the community-based association. It is very difficult and quite risky for a public servant to make such social judgments.
Many water users' associations are several decades old and have a great depth of experience in running their rivers under periods of stress. On some major rivers, such as the Barwon-Darling within the Murray-Darling Basin, a representative council of water users' associations, plus local government, indigenous interests, and environmental interests has been formed to oversee major policy development.
Equity Issues Arising from Policy Changes
Policy reforms in water resource management invariably create equity dilemmas associated with the proposed formula for revised water allocations or rights. Should these allocations be granted on the basis of a formal, standard license entitlement (existing or revised) or be based on history of use?
6 This dilemma arises for both the initial allocation scheme for a river or aquifer (if water is already being used, rights exist, whether they are formally recognized or not) and for all subsequent reviews of the allocation scheme.
A simple example can illustrate the equity dilemma. If the new allocation norm for a particular use category is 10 water units, what treatment should be afforded to a user who has a history of consistently using 15 units? To allocate 15 units would diminish reliability for everyone else, but to allocate the norm of 10 units may impose undue financial hardship on the water user. Another equity dilemma arises for an under-user with a history of use of 5 units. To allocate the norm of 10 units would confer a windfall gain on the water user, but to allocate only 5 units would deny the user future growth to levels currently enjoyed by other water users in the allocation scheme.
The NSW approach to this is to undertake intensive public participation in an effort to gain some consensus on the rules. While the consensus naturally varies from community to community, typically the outcome is to (reluctantly) accept the creation of some windfall gains and to either grandfather 7 the overuse or, more commonly, to impose a progressive reduction factor to the overuse over a number of years deemed to be financially absorbable by the water-using enterprise.
The other administrative issue that invariably arises is that, despite welldeveloped policy and thorough consultation, a few water users do not readily fit the pattern. The NSW approach is to simultaneously deal with such anomalous cases, and with any appeals by water users aggrieved with their revised allocations, by creating an independent Anomalies Committee.
Importantly, this nonstatutory, nonjudicial committee and its operating rules are set up in partnership with the community ahead of granting any revised allocations. Typically, the committee will contain an agricultural expert, a water expert, and two or three landholder representatives. Water users with anomalies or appeals will first present their case to the water agency. If dissatisfied with the outcome, water users can then present their case to the Anomalies Committee on the basis that the water agency has previously agreed to accept the judgment of this independent mediator. This approach has enjoyed a very high success rate. The committee disbands at the end of the process.
Water Rights within Irrigation Schemes
As noted, NSW has privatized all of its former government owned and operated irrigation schemes. The new owners are essentially a collective of all the irrigators who now hold shares (in proportion to their former water rights) in a private, limited liability company subject to normal company law. Interestingly, asset transfer from state to the irrigation companies has been accompanied by a substantial 10-year capital annuity from the state in recognition of the backlog of asset maintenance and renewal that had built up during the former public administration. The state treasury was able to demonstrate that this annuity was a positive investment by the state.
Because of the privatization, the state now grants the irrigation companies a single license for bulk water access. Following the complex process of negotiating the form of the irrigation companies and the means for post-privatization protection of the irrigators' interests in both water rights and water supply, the state retained no direct interest in the internal water management and internal allocations (Taylor, McGlynn, and Martin 2001) . These activities are now solely the prerogative of the irrigation companies who are free to carry these out in any manner they desire. There is an indirect interest in water operations by the state, however, from an external environmental management perspective-as for any other waterusing enterprise.
Outcomes from Reforming Water Rights Initial Water Rights Implementation 1885-1985
Because Australia adopted comprehensive, administratively granted usufruct water licenses well ahead of major growth during the twentieth century in water-using developments, a key outcome has been relatively ordered water resource management, with a minimum of legal conflict. Water users may take a water agency to court for its alleged failure to issue a license or its heavy-handedness in amending license conditions, but legal disputes between water users in relation to competition for water are rare.
The population has known no other approach to water allocation and generally appreciates that during drought relative water shares are fairly apportioned and reasonably managed. This has been particularly important in a country with highly variable run-off patterns. A key outcome of the comprehensive, unified water rights system is that there is no doubt or confusion about who controls and manages water rights. Everyone knows that this control is vested in government and administered by a single, highly identifiable agency.
More importantly, from a water reform perspective in restoring some environmental balance to the rivers, it is possible for governments to diminish quantity or reliability of supplies to irrigators by at least some degree without compensation. All of the Murray-Darling Basin states are making adjustments in favor of the environment, although governments generally agree that considerations of equity and economics will limit their actions.
The water rights system underpinned the orderly development of a significant irrigation industry that makes a substantial contribution to the rural economy and sustains a number of rural towns and cities. In this regard, it is interesting to compare the water rights systems of NSW and Victoria. While the philosophical and legal basis of the rights is similar, the allocation of water against the rights is not.
Victoria has taken a low-risk approach. Its basic irrigation water rights have an annual security similar to the rights issued in NSW for town water supply. Along the Murray River, for example, Victoria aims to supply full rights in 96 percent of years. NSW takes a much greater chance of shortfall on its general security water rights, and aimed for 70 percent security-defined as a 70 percent chance of getting full allocations by the end of December each year (basically mid-summer).
In fact, most NSW rights have turned out to be less secure because of the flawed assumption that only about three quarters of the rights would ever be activated in any year. Some of the northern rivers in the NSW portion of the MurrayDarling Basin have securities in the 35-45 percent range. Nonetheless, irrigation continues to prosper through on-farm measures such as construction of on-farm water storages to decrease reliability risks and through river operation measures such as continuous accounting.
Two of the outcomes of water allocation and the water rights system in NSW as they applied from 1885 to 1985 have formed major drivers for the water rights reforms previously described:
• a decline in river health aggravated by high levels of water extractioneffectively an over-allocation of water; and
• a barrier to water trading as a means of ensuring continuing economic growth (despite water volumes being limited) arising from a strong nexus between a particular parcel of land and the water rights associated with it. In some river systems, transfer zones were introduced to assist with environmental and other management issues. These zones limited trade to within the zones or, in some cases, applied reduction factors to allow for trading into zones of rising water tables, or to account for river transmission losses. Such zones also apply on the interstate Murray River, where a pilot interstate water trade is well established.
Few studies have examined the economic outcomes of water trading. However, the studies that have been done indicate a substantial and growing benefit. An early study reported that during the drought of 1987-88 the increase in the value of irrigated agriculture attributable to water transfers was around A$17 million (Sturgess and Wright 1993) . In the more typical year of 1988-89, some 280 temporary transfers took place and increased income to irrigation by an estimated A$5.6 million. This increase due to trade was estimated to have risen to A$10 million by 1990-91. Indicative figures for the 1997/98 season estimated that some 824 MCM of temporary trade and the 39 MCM of permanent trade increased the value of irrigated agriculture by around A$30 million and A$35 million respectively (Marsden Jacob Associates 1999) .
A High Level Steering Group of the national Standing Committee on Agriculture and Resource Management stated that "trade allows water resources across Australia to be used more productively" (SCARM-HLSG 2000) . The group notes however, that much of the potential benefit is yet to be realized. One economic study (AASTE 1999) shows that "there is enough water in the low-to-marginal value end of the irrigation market to supply all the likely long-term growth needs of higher-value intensive irrigation activities in the Murray-Darling Basin." In other words, the Cap is not the end of economic growth.
A significant issue in trade across the transboundary Murray River is the distinct differences in the nature of water allocations to license holders in NSW and in Victoria. As noted previously, the two states have different approaches to the reliability of water allocations. This makes interstate trading by individual water users a more complex affair than trades within states. Minimizing this impediment would add value to water trade in that valley. Other unfinished business is that states generally have still to introduce a full range of more sophisticated transfer vehicles, such as long-term leasing, sale and leaseback arrangements, and possibly even a water futures market.
The second outcome of note has been a strong public perception of the failing health of the rivers of the Murray-Darling Basin associated with high levels of water extraction, and an accompanying and growing political will to take the hard decisions involved in remedial actions. Environmental flow regimes have now reduced the reliability of water available to general security access licenses (primarily irrigation licenses). The environmental allocation of water to the Macquarie Marshes is halting degradation of the wetlands, although it is too early to confidently evaluate recent measures in other rivers such as translucent dam releases and other flow strategies. Evaluation is particularly difficult in Australia's variable climate where conditions drier or wetter than median can persist for a decade or more and completely mask ecological changes resulting from modest flow interventions.
One national study (Cullen, Whittington, and Fraser 2000) has, however, noted, "The emergence of water trading is already allowing water to move from inappropriate areas to places where it can be used to earn a greater return with less environmental impact. This is already providing an environmental benefit."
The third (and associated) outcome of note has been the introduction in the NSW Water Management Act 2000 of an adaptive management approach to the allocations or water entitlements attached to water access licenses. As noted previously, the new Act introduces a common Water Management Plan for discrete water resources that, in effect, freezes the water allocations associated with access licenses for the duration of the plan, but allows the state to amend the license on renewal to meet emerging environmental or other considerations. The state can still amend the access license at any time, but is then obliged to pay compensation. The 10-year license period in the Water Management Plan comes from a fortunate synergy. Investment and finance houses advised that they would readily invest in development with a 10-year resource access right, particularly if the renewal rights were well defined. This matched a generally held belief that meaningful advances in knowledge of ecosystem response to management interventions might take a decade or so to materialize.
In this regard, it is interesting to again compare the reforms in Victoria. Victoria had begun earlier than most states in working toward better-defined water rights as part of a comprehensive plan to create financial sustainability of the water industry. These included a bulk entitlement process for state-owned irrigation areas, which in the Victorian section of the Murray-Darling Basin were by far their largest water users. Bulk entitlements have also been developed for urban water authorities and other public bodies. The entitlements are granted in perpetuity, with limited ability for government to intervene. Entitlement holders can make trade-offs between yield and reliability.
The bulk entitlement process is putting in place a water allocation framework that
• maintains the current environmental values of rivers;
• allows for reallocation of water for environmental purposes through market mechanisms; and
• ensures that future water developments will be assessed so that they adequately meet the environmental requirements of river systems.
The essential difference is that NSW hopes to meet the need for retrieval of water for instream uses largely by uncompensated adaptive management of entitlements whereas Victoria has opted principally for market mechanisms. Not surprisingly, vigorous debate has arisen, and at the end of 2002 the matter of compensation for all retrieved water was taken to COAG for consideration. A Senate Committee has also begun an inquiry into water resource usage. The debate continues, and reveals both a limited understanding by some participants of the modern complexities of water resource management and a strong need for accelerated research into the value of environmental flows. Toward the end of 2003 COAG agreed on a National Water Initiative, which had "over-allocation" in the Murray-Darling Basin in mind and which was essentially a freshening up of the 1994 water reforms with an emphasis on a national approach to water property rights and the improvement of water market mechanisms. COAG announced that member governments would contribute a total of $A500 million initially. The Murray-Darling Ministerial Council followed up on this and decided that it would concentrate initial efforts on securing the health of six significant ecological assets of the Murray River. The council announced that the necessary additional water "will come from a matrix of options with a priority for on-farm initiatives, efficiency gains, infrastructure improvements and rationalisation, and market-based approaches, and purchase of water from willing sellers, rather than by way of compulsory acquisition." 9 The fourth and final noteworthy outcome has been the belated recognition by the public, by developers, by irrigators, and by politicians that water is indeed a finite resource. After initial vigorous protests that followed the capping of water extractions in the Murray-Darling Basin, the proponents of new industries no longer question that if they need water supplies they must purchase them from an existing user. Irrigators have also come to realize that halting growth in water use has protected their current reliability of water supply. This is nothing short of a revolution in public thinking in a country with a strong economic development ethic and bodes well for the future evolution of sustainable water management policies in Australia.
